



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## SOUTH CAROLINA AND THE EARLY TARIFFS<sup>1</sup>

To one familiar with the monotonous uniformity of the prairie states of the northwest with their homogeneous population, their uniform industrial organization, and their lack of clashing sectional traditions, the diversity of the little state of, South Carolina proves a revelation. It is not divided by the Appalachian system into cismontane and transmontane sections, as are the neighboring states; instead of two South Carolina has had at least four or five sections, each with its peculiar industrial organization, population, traditions, and political outlook. The principal cause for this clear-cut industrial, social, and at times political dissimilarity between the various sections of the state is to be found in its peculiar physiography and from the earliest times these geographic factors have operated decisively in shaping the history of the state.

First there was the marine belt with its very rich soil extending back from the sea for a distance varying from a few miles to possibly fifty. This became the seat of the early colonial planting aristocracy which engaged in the cultivation of indigo and rice. Immediately back of this marine belt and separating it from the upland pine belt was a zone of pine and cypress swamps sparsely filled with runaway negroes, outcasts, and wild cattle. The third zone, the upland pine, when cleared of its forests proved a rich agricultural section well adapted to the short staple cotton. In the fourth place came the sand and red clay hills varying in width from a few miles to fifty or seventy-five and although having a thin soil, yet early put to the cultivation of cotton. Lastly there was an ill-defined piedmont section with its Scotch-Irish settlers given to a diversified grain farming on a small scale. This irregular zone lay as a hinterland behind the other zones and extended along the whole North Carolina boundary except where pierced by the larger river valleys such as that of the Pedee.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read at the annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association in St. Paul, May 10, 1918.

For purposes of political action these various sections of the state tended towards a grouping into three main dynamic areas. The first was the old coastal region with its ports and commercial interests; separated from this by the negative belt of pine barrens was the cotton-raising area comprising roughly the upland pine belt and the sand and clay hills. This region was far from regular in contour, being influenced largely by the altitude suitable for cotton, by soil conditions, and especially by transportation facilities. It also might be designated as the region where the system of the large farm constantly tended to shift into the plantation system. The third section was the piedmont or "back country," a region of relatively high altitudes, broken soil, poor or no transportation facilities, and given up to the "small farm" with its characteristic domestic economy and white labor. Of course, these divisions of the state were not at every point mutually exclusive and none of the sections were completely homogeneous.

By the close of the war of 1812 the three areas found themselves in widely varying conditions. The agricultural interests of the old coastal plain were decaying, although rice and sea island cotton offered to certain limited areas a lucrative crop. But the dominating factor was the commercial interests of "the city," that is, Charleston, at that time the third seaport of the United States. The back country had become very populous, and had already won a more nearly proportional representation in the legislature. Its sturdy Scotch-Irish settlers continued their vocations as small farmers following a diversified cultivation and knowing little of the great staple, cotton. Not so in the great interior section of the state. Here cotton had captured the land and the plantation system was firmly entrenched. Cotton prices had been very high before the war of 1812, consequently land and slaves sold high. The region was prosperous and inclined to be easy-going.

In the minds of many South Carolina has always been the land of particularism or anti-nationalism, a conception which results from its attitude throughout the decades between 1830 and 1860. But South Carolina for the twenty years preceding 1830 was dominated by leaders who were strong in their devotion to the national ideal. From no other quarter did the Virginia school of state rights of the first and second decade of the

nineteenth century receive such vigorous assaults as from the leaders of the Palmetto state. McDuffie's pamphlet, *One of the people*, written in 1821, his answer to "Consolidation," was full of the most ardent sentiments in favor of a centralized government as opposed to the looser form of federal government advocated by Judge Roane and John Taylor of Caroline. In thundering periods McDuffie laid the whole charge of stirring up dissension at the door of "ambitious men of inferior talents," men, who, hopeless of a national career, wished to exalt the states, "the theatres on which they expect to acquire distinction."<sup>2</sup>

In the same year James Hamilton in a Fourth of July oration delivered in Charleston declared that their knowledge of the existence of the national government sprang more from "*its protection than its restraints*."<sup>3</sup> In 1831 Langdon Cheves, speaking of the earlier nationalistic tendency of his state, declared "there was a time when we adopted much too liberal and enlarged a construction of its [the national government's] powers, but oppression has made us wiser."<sup>4</sup>

If one seeks an explanation of the early nationalist attitude of South Carolina after the war of 1812, one need not go far. The state found itself at the close of the war in a very enviable situation as compared to most of its sister states. Its sons had had a prominent part in the national administration during the war, and many of the resulting policies such as the bank, the tariff of 1816, and internal improvements could well be called South Carolina measures. By these agencies its patriotic sons hoped to make substantial and real the increased national independence gained by force of arms. The Scotch-Irish of the piedmont, through their aggressive enmity to Great Britain, undoubtedly rendered such a course easy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> George McDuffie, *One of the people* (Charleston, 1821). The contents of this pamphlet appeared in the newspapers of South Carolina between July, 1820, and July, 1821, under the title "Natural and state rights considered," in answer to a series of public letters entitled "The prospect before us . . ." signed Trio which appeared in the *Milledgeville Gazette*. This series is commonly referred to as "Consolidation."

<sup>3</sup> James Hamilton, *Fourth of July oration*, 1821, pamphlet in the Willis collection, Charleston, South Carolina. The author is General Hamilton of nullification renown.

<sup>4</sup> Langdon Cheves, *Occasional pamphlets*, 2: 1, in the same collection.

<sup>5</sup> McDuffie, a Scotch-Irishman, compared the American boy's hatred of England

South Carolina during the war had adopted vigorous measures to stimulate the growth of home manufactures. In August, 1812, the legislature had unanimously adopted resolutions looking toward "the improvement and advancement of domestic manufactures," and at least one establishment, the Greenville cotton factory, was given a liberal bonus.<sup>6</sup>

Prosperity was smiling on South Carolina during the last half of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Cotton prices were very high, the planters were consequently over-sanguine, land values and prices of slaves rose sharply, and genial content made the state inclined and able to sacrifice its more immediate material good, if necessary, for the good of the country in general.<sup>7</sup>

Entangled with these several causes of South Carolina nationalism was another very potent factor, national politics. It is hard to tell whether the nationalistic leaders were more actuated by their inherent ideas and ideals than by the political expediency of producing popular arguments to be used against the particularistic party affiliated with the followers of W. H. Crawford of Georgia. Under the state leadership of Senator William Smith, this state rights party in South Carolina was always formidable to the young nationals or Calhoun party. In several cases it was able to control the legislature and pledge the state to a furtherance of their doctrines. It was this particular fight that inspired McDuffie to write his glowing phrases on the blessings of a centralized government and to denounce their "high mightnesses," the state authorities, declaring that his confidence in the national government was equal to that felt in his own state.<sup>8</sup>

Within a decade after the close of the war of 1812, however, a great change had come in South Carolina and its statesmen. Their ardor for a centralized government had cooled decidedly.

to Hannibal's vow against the Romans. This was in his speech in the house of representatives on the bill to reduce and fix the military strength of the United States, a pamphlet edition of which was published in Charleston in 1822.

<sup>6</sup> Manuscript journal of the South Carolina senate, 1822 (at Columbia, South Carolina), 12: 18.

<sup>7</sup> Edward Stanwood, *American tariff controversies in the nineteenth century* (Boston, 1903), 1: 160.

<sup>8</sup> McDuffie, *One of the people*.

The causes for the transformation are many and intertwined, but they fall mainly into two categories: first, the new economic conditions into which South Carolina had gradually slipped during the decade, and secondly, the particular variety of nationalistic legislation adopted by the federal government, such as the second bank of the United States, the renewed activity in internal improvements, interference with the institution of slavery, and the definite acceptance of a protective policy.

There is no doubt that at first the second bank of the United States was popular in South Carolina. The intimate part played by Calhoun and other South Carolina leaders in congress in building the bank was at the same time both evidence and cause for such a frame of mind. The large number of Carolinians investing in stock during the first eighteen months that the subscription books were open testifies in incontrovertible terms to this fact. But soon there was a change. The records show a rapid falling off in the number of citizens holding stock and an organized effort to embarrass the bank and its Charleston branch was soon manifested, just as it had been in nearly all parts of the south and west.

The banking situation in South Carolina was unique in some respects. The state had a very complete and satisfactory state banking system, so that naturally those financially interested in the state system resented the coming of the United States bank within the state. At first there was developed considerable friction, especially over the United States bank's determination to force specie payments and a higher standard of banking ethics upon private and state banks. By the time the crisis of nullification broke, however, matters in the banking world had adjusted themselves gradually and satisfactorily to nearly all classes coming into business relations with the bank. By the late twenties and early thirties the Charleston branch was carrying a large number of planters and it was well known that its favorable exchange gave a marked advantage to the merchants trading to China, a class largely represented in Charleston. Moreover, the lenient policy as regards short-time paper was estimated to be equivalent to one-half a cent a pound to the upland cotton grower, and from one-half to two cents to the producer of sea island cotton.

Of all the many irritants presented by federal legislation to South Carolina, none proved more vital than the policy of internal improvements. South Carolina's attitude toward federal public works was largely determined by its natural features. In the first place the state was exceptionally well covered with rivers, which with slight improvements were navigable for considerable distances. In its prosperous days, South Carolina had entered eagerly upon a program of comprehensive public works, even before many of the northern states had made a move. Nearly half a generation before Gallatin drew up for President Jefferson his famous report, the old Palmetto state had chartered its Santee canal company. This company spent vast sums on a system designed to render navigable the five principal rivers of the state. Of the twenty-two districts of the state, this system of public development would have covered fourteen completely, and five more partially.

All this it might seem would have prepared South Carolina for hearty support of federal aid to internal improvements, but certain conditions conspired to prevent such a result. In the first place, although the state, especially throughout the plantation area, was remarkably favored with natural waterways and alert to the desirability of furnishing its citizens with facilities for water transportation, yet nature herself prevented an efficient waterway system. The streams were too swift and subject to too rapid rises, while the sandy character of the soil robbed the river banks of their power of resistance in times of extra strain. Furthermore, a glance at a map of the state shows how isolated South Carolina was from its sister states industrially. It demanded few things from them beyond its meat supply and draft animals, and these could be driven through the mountain passes. On the other hand, South Carolina early found the outlet for its great staple crops in Europe. Hence the domestic trade with the west and northwest was not remunerative enough to stimulate the construction of public works through the mountains, to connect the state with its neighbors. Beyond the Savannah river was a recently settled region engaged in the same kind of plantation life, offering no opportunity for mutual commerce; North Carolina ministered little to her economic wants.

Although cotton was the chief *raison d'être* for South Carolina's earlier internal improvements enthusiasm, yet the exclusive cultivation of cotton was inimical to any general scheme, because it was a crop that could be hauled long distances in the slack time and so could not be depended upon to follow a line of public works with its incident tolls. By the time Turnhull wrote his *Crisis*, the author, realizing this isolation, could wish that nature had made the state limits a wall absolutely impassable.

By the time federal interest had become keenest in a comprehensive system of internal improvements, South Carolina had come to despair of building up its own domestic system of waterways. At the same time the state realized how its lack of commercial relations with other sections of the United States rendered futile the hope that it might share equally with the other states in the benefits of great national works. Moreover, with the development of a general hostility to the tariff, this opposition to federal public works was intensified because South Carolinians realized that such a system would tend to fasten the tariff system forever upon the country by absorbing the surplus revenue, no matter how large.

The connection between the system of internal improvements and the surplus-producing tariff was patent. Even to the South Carolina adherents of "the American system" the political leverage it afforded the national administration was not concealed. In 1828 they saw the tariff forces furnish the votes to give Ohio eight hundred thousand acres of public land as a subsidy for her canal system.<sup>10</sup>

This tendency to oppose the tariff because of hostility to internal improvements was soon eclipsed by the greater hatred of the tariff *per se*. The general survey bill of 1824, "authorizing the president to cause surveys to be made for such roads and canals as he deemed of national importance,"<sup>11</sup> received a majority of the congressional votes of the state and they came from those districts comprising the cotton section of the state where prosperity prevailed because cotton prices ruled high. It is also

<sup>10</sup> There is a spirited denunciation in the *Southern Patriot*, June 19, 1828.

<sup>11</sup> Frederick J. Turner, *Rise of the new west, 1819-1829* (*The American nation: a history*, v. 14—New York, 1906), 232. Note especially the map showing the geographical distribution of the house vote on the bill.



to be recalled that at this time when McDuffie and Calhoun were still numbered among the nationalists, the army of particularists, led by Senator William Smith, was recruited largely from the "back-country," that is, the non-cotton-planting section.

Beginning with the Missouri question, there came a series of events that made the south fear for its peculiar institution. One of these was federal aid to the colonization society, which might involve the expropriation of public domain. Another was the clash between the national administration and South Carolina over its "native seamen act," and a third was President Adams' slave trade convention. From the first the federal control of the foreign slave trade conflicted with the interests of the slaveholders of South Carolina. A planter carrying his slaves from Georgetown to Charleston had to go to the trouble of registering them and paying a fee.<sup>12</sup> These things were enough to render the black belt restive even before John Randolph shocked them with the nakedness of his prophecy that the centralized government would next turn to the task of freeing the slaves. Nathaniel Macon declared that there was more chance of federal emancipation of slaves than of a comprehensive system of public works.

Possibly no other element tended more to alienate South Carolina after the war of 1812 than this sense of danger to the institution of slavery from the inevitable interference which a centralized government would be sure to offer. Intensifying this uneasiness was a factor which one is likely today to forget, the constant though perhaps vague dread of servile insurrection which hung over the south. The southern newspapers of the period studiously avoided any very explicit mention of such matters; but after the great Charleston insurrection in 1821 the succeeding decade was especially full of such fears for the whites.

The situation was not alleviated by the certain knowledge that the institution of human slavery outside America was doomed. Even before 1826 President Cooper of South Carolina college had maintained in his lectures that servile labor was more expensive to the master than free. By this time the state had come to believe that the blacks could be used only in the cul-

<sup>12</sup> *Charleston Courier*, September 24, 1829.

tivation of staples, thus forcing the whites to a non-industrial development. Its sensitiveness was increased by the belief that Virginia and North Carolina would prove recreant to the slave interests. Virginia's interest in the acquisition of the Texas country was frowned on by the citizens of South Carolina as a sinister scheme of Virginia to "sweep off her slaves" and then "to hoist the banner of the Free States."<sup>13</sup>

Insofar as the growing radicalism of the state before 1832 was based on financial depression, slavery was a contributory factor to its spread. In the four years preceding January 1, 1808, there had been entered at Charleston alone nearly forty thousand slaves who sold at high prices. The speculation both for slaves and land resulted in ruinous rates of interest which could be met only so long as cotton sold at high prices. But by the late twenties cotton had fallen and financial distress spread over the planting sections, rendering them ready for radical measures against the popular scapegoat, the tariff.

The tariff issue shows vividly the quick change from an intense nationalistic attitude to a deep and abiding sectionalism in the state. Although those Carolinians who helped build the tariff of 1816 advocated a moderate revenue rate, yet those same leaders by their speeches did not stand committed as hostile to the protection of American industries.<sup>14</sup> In large part as the result of the natural resentment over Great Britain's closing of the West Indian markets, a trade in which Charleston was still much interested,<sup>15</sup> the South Carolina planters were eager to render the cotton interests completely free from any dependence upon English mills for a market for their cotton wool. While the south as a whole cast twice as many votes against this tariff as for it, yet the most characteristically cotton state, South Carolina, reversed this ratio by registering a two to one affirmative vote.

It was not long, however, before the cotton interests came to

<sup>13</sup> *Charleston Courier*, September 24, 1829.

<sup>14</sup> Much has been written from a southern point of view to clear Lowndes and other South Carolina leaders from the imputation of ever having been other than orthodox anti-tariff men. See Harriott H. Ravenal, *Life and times of William Lowndes of South Carolina, 1782-1822* (Boston, 1901).

<sup>15</sup> Barnett A. Elzas, *The Jews of South Carolina from the earliest times to the present day* (Philadelphia, 1905), 177.

see that England was much more bent on getting cotton wool than on carrying out a policy of commercial discrimination against its late enemies, the Americans. As this conception swept over the state, the anti-tariff argument changed. Less was said of a depleted treasury because of prohibitory rates; new emphasis was laid upon the blessings of free trade, while the horrors of the immorality in the factory towns were painted in high colors.

By the time of the debates on the tariff of 1820, the planting sections of the state had come to see more and more clearly how little they had to fear from England's shutting out their cotton, provided that country could find a market for its exports in sufficient quantity to equalize the balance of trade.<sup>16</sup> Although the state as well as the entire south was almost a unit against the bill, yet there was little violent agitation or excitement in South Carolina aroused by this proposed tariff of 1820.<sup>17</sup>

In the light of subsequent events it is interesting to note that the two sections of the state most alive to the evils of the proposed tariff of 1820 were the coast and back country, while the great interior cotton area remained comparatively quiet. It is significant that while the South Carolina delegation in congress cast only two affirmative votes on the tariff of 1820, both came from this interior cotton producing region.

Each of these two disturbed sections, however, was actuated by a different set of motives. The chief concern of the coast, largely identified as it was with the shipping interests, was for unrestricted foreign trade because it had come to feel that the state was destined to be an exporter of a great staple which England was eager to take without discrimination even if carried in American bottoms.<sup>18</sup> The "upper counties," on the other hand, were aroused because they feared the federal government would be driven to direct taxes as a result of the depleted resources arising from the prohibitory rates. They also argued that the consumer would pay more for his goods and in characteristic frontier style charged the old and effete east with try-

<sup>16</sup> Speech of William Lowndes in *Annals of congress*, 16 congress, 1 session, 2: 1731 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Excluding Kentucky, there were only three southern affirmative votes. Turner, *Rise of the new west*, 144 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *Anti-tariff memorial of Charleston, 1820*, in Willis collection.

ing to bolster itself up in an uneven race with the new country. They declared in their petition, "It is natural for old states which have once been the seat of power to repine at the loss of their strength."<sup>19</sup>

The situation had changed by 1824 when South Carolina was confronted with another piece of tariff legislation.<sup>20</sup> But the *Southern Patriot* speaking in 1827 of this movement of 1824 said, "Then it was merely the Metropolis that petitioned—the bone and sinew of the state—the agricultural interest did not move."<sup>21</sup> Now there were new elements in the alignment of the tariff and anti-tariff forces. Many of these new factors were matters of personality. Judge William Smith, the former leader of the particularist forces, who had been replaced in the United States senate by R. Y. Hayne, was now in the legislature intent on building up a party of particularism against the dominant party led by the enthusiastic nationalists. To his aid came President Cooper of South Carolina college, who had actively entered the anti-tariff ranks soon after coming to the college in 1819. The Columbia memorial of 1824 against the tariff was probably his handiwork. It must be remarked, however, that despite its authorship and place of its origin—Columbia was soon to be the hotbed of radicalism—it was, when contrasted with later utterances, a conservative document, indulging in praise of the free trade policy, expressing fear lest direct taxes would result, and denouncing the tariff majority's program of "Chinese exclusion" as a system which would tend "to the annihilation of all importation,"—an idea soon to be popularized into McDuffie's "forty bale" theory.

The Charleston memorial against this same tariff of 1824 illustrates the close relationship between a locality's industrial well-being and its vehemence against the aggressions of the federal government. The memorialists pointed out that "a feeling

<sup>19</sup> *Memorial of sundry inhabitants of upper counties of South Carolina, November 28, 1820*, in Pennsylvania historical society library.

<sup>20</sup> It is commonly asserted that in 1824 there began that violent anti-tariff agitation which finally resulted in nullification. Benjamin F. Perry, *Reminiscences of public men, with speeches and addresses* (Greenville, South Carolina, 1889), second series, 200, and Ulrich B. Phillips, *Georgia and state rights: a study of the political history of Georgia from the revolution to the civil war, with particular regard to federal relations* (Washington, 1902), 117. .

<sup>21</sup> *Southern Patriot*, September 17, 1827.

of gloomy despondence was settling on the 'lower country' "— a condition far removed from the prosperous times of 1820. New ground was broken in emphasizing the unconstitutionality of such unequal legislation. There was also an ominous hint at disunion and a declaration that the "bond of union" was but a "confederacy of independent states."<sup>22</sup>

While the feeling against the tariff of 1824 was drastic within certain sections of the state, yet it lacked elements that three years later were to sweep the state from coast to mountains into a fever of opposition to the "woolens bill." The situation in South Carolina between the tariff agitation of 1824 and the "woolens bill" ran largely along old lines. The Adams administration was far from happy in handling the delicate points of friction. Adams neglected an easy opportunity to allay the fears of the black belt regarding his hostile attitude toward the institution of slavery.<sup>23</sup> Added to this was his blunder in refusing to accept England's offer to open the West Indian ports, thus fanning the fires of discontent in South Carolina. Moreover, his extreme internal improvements program with its "light houses in the skies" greatly alarmed a section now steadily becoming convinced that their peculiar institution would be safe only through the jealous preservation and extension of the powers and functions of their own state government.

With the "woolens bill" and the "tariff of abominations," the anti-tariff movement in South Carolina passed into a distinct epoch. Unlike the tariffs of 1820 and 1824, the "woolens bill" was not preceded by any continued agitation in South Carolina, but the excitement of the summer and autumn after the defeat of this bill, when it was evident that the protectionists meant to renew the struggle, made up in vehemence for the previous

<sup>22</sup> For the memorial see *Annals of congress*, 18 congress, 1 session, 2: 3075. This document was undoubtedly before James Hamilton when for the first time on the floor of congress he raised the question of the constitutionality of the tariff. Hamilton's idea of constitutionality is the same, that is, legislation must do more than conform to a written document—it must conform to a sense of justice. The moderation in McDuffie's speech replying to Clay in discussing the act of 1824 is more nearly typical of the state's attitude. *Ibid.*, 2: 88, 2400 ff.

<sup>23</sup> It is certain that the Adams administration was not planning any radical action looking toward emancipation. Turner, *Rise of the new west*, 279.

apathy, attributable probably to the unusually high prices of cotton which had lately prevailed.<sup>24</sup>

If the planting sections had been inclined to remain quiet between 1824 and 1827, such was not the case in the three other industrial sections, "the city," the old lowlands, and the back counties. The lowlands were in a particularly ugly temper. The prosperity of the upland cotton interests had been their undoing by drawing capital, people, and energy away from them. The inevitable decay was accentuated this season by a disaster of the principal crop, sea island cotton. The montane section, having few negroes to clothe in tariff-burdened woollens, untouched by the interests of foreign commerce and living a life of domestic economy, could have found little in the proposed legislation to influence them directly; they were opposed to it for the ordinary frontiersman's reasons: the fear that a depleted revenue would cause direct taxes and the fear that the cost of the few manufactured goods which they bought would be increased.

"The city" protested in terms familiar to the commercial interests: the danger to export trade from a restrictive policy, and the unfairness of supporting manufactures by burdening shipping. It was only natural that these hackneyed arguments should have failed to stir up any enthusiasm and that the radicals, when aroused in 1827 and 1828, should denounce Charleston for its lukewarmness.

Possibly catching their cue from the notorious sectionalism of the "woollens bill," some of the agitators proposed a program of retaliation. These proposals led from non-importation and non-consumption of tariff-aided goods to the more positive agencies of turning the sand hills into sheep runs and also of producing their own draft animals, formerly drawn from the west, a region now allied with the protection ranks.<sup>25</sup> This tendency to think in terms of sectional lines is brought out clearly in Calhoun's *Exposition of 1828*. A principal line of reasoning in that document was the injustice of a protective system to the planting section

<sup>24</sup> A corner in the English cotton market had nearly doubled the average price in 1825.

<sup>25</sup> See the report of the committee in 1827 in the *Southern Agriculturist*, 2: 19-22.

and upon this argument the author based his contention of the unconstitutionality of the tariff.

If another element had not entered the field, these two pieces of tariff legislation in all probability would have worked the crisis in South Carolina. But in two ways the natural development of the anti-tariff agitation was arrested or diverted. First the campaign for the presidency of the state's famous son, General Jackson, whose tariff record was sufficiently dubious, seriously complicated affairs during the summer of 1828; while after 1830 the subordination of all other programs to the radical nullification program swallowed up the tariff issue almost completely, thus approaching that later phase in which the tariff controversy can be understood only as a part of the great program of "putting the state on its sovereignty."

The region of the largest anti-tariff mass meetings reveals the sections most disturbed by the proposed legislation. Early in the summer of 1828 the parishes of the old tidewater region had poured forth a surprising array of radical protests while later in the fall, as the election approached, the upland cotton region took the lead. The McDuffie meeting at Abbeville numbered five thousand and was probably the largest political gathering ever seen in the state. Sharply contrasted with the ardent desire for radical action was the apathy of the city and back country. The position of the latter exhibits no surprising features. But so unique was the attitude of Charleston that the editor of even such a radical sheet as the *Charleston Mercury* rushed to a defense of the devotion of his fellow citizens to the peculiar interests of their state. The editor cried down all the makeshifts that had been proposed by one section and another and demanded a united effort to overthrow the entire nationalistic regime—tariff, internal improvements, and all. The argument savors of the early Jeffersonian "revolution of 1800" propaganda; and seems based on the same line of reasoning: elect Andrew Jackson to cure all our ills.

It is doubtful whether the *Charleston Mercury* expressed even approximately the spirit of Charleston. There can be no doubt that by 1828 there still remained considerable interest in the development of American manufactures. A careful survey of the press of the state in the year 1828 substantiates this. The

*Charleston Courier* was devoted to the protective policy and, while demonstrating that the protective duties were not in their entirety added to the consumer's cost, was at the same time urging the citizens of the state to engage in the protected interests which were adaptable to the condition of their state. Chief among these were sugar, indigo, cochineal, sheep, hemp, and cotton bagging. Such sentiments found a response in a strip of territory running diagonally across the state at the foot of the mountains. This section was ambitious of a future in manufacturing and is today the seat of the flourishing cotton mills. The *Greenville Republican*, a representative of this section, declared: "It is certain that if the effects of the tariff be to produce domestic manufactures, that Greenville is in the part of South Carolina which must become the manufacturing district."<sup>26</sup>

The presidential campaign of 1828 was, as has already been noted, a peculiar solvent of political lines so far as South Carolina was concerned. Many things conspired to force all factions to hide their identity in a general support of Jackson. The old Crawford-Smith-Jeffersonian state rights party had seen the course of political destiny and had come under the Jackson standard, while many conservatives seemed to see in the Jackson propaganda a palliative or at least a means of postponing any radical action by their state. On the other hand the radicals, while not enthusiastic over the beneficent effects of Jackson's election, could do nothing less than support his candidacy, although there is plenty of evidence that their leaders realized the futility of any hope for adequate redress from a change of presidents only.

Senator R. Y. Hayne represents this last class. His letters to Jackson during and immediately after the campaign are full of warm praise together with declarations of unlimited faith in the ability of the hero of New Orleans to heal South Carolina's wounds, but at the same time they are replete with adroit and insistent advice as to the future conduct of the president-elect on the troublesome issues of tariff and internal improvements.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Greenville Republican*, August 9, 1828. This paper later became the *Greenville Mountaineer*, a very influential anti-nullification organ.

<sup>27</sup> Hayne to Jackson, June 5, 1827, and September 3, 1828, in Jackson manuscripts, library of congress.



Another type of action is seen in the conduct of James Hamilton, the most aggressive leader of the radical forces. In a letter to Jackson dated November 15, 1828, General Hamilton informs him that both the delivery and publishing of his own radical anti-tariff Walterborough speech were withheld "until I felt certain it could do no harm to your election." It seems clear that such a man as Hamilton hoped for more from Jackson than from a reëlection of Adams but that he was nevertheless in a frame of mind to demand redress for his own state. It is interesting in the light of the later nullification episode to see that Jackson never took the pains to cut the leaves of the pamphlet speech, which is still folded in the letter of its author.<sup>28</sup>

Efforts were made to harmonize the 1828 session of the legislature with Jackson's wishes. A. P. Hayne, a compatriot of New Orleans, proposed to visit the Hermitage and "then to visit at Columbia during the session of the Legislature." He states that others thought "it would have a good effect."<sup>29</sup>

If the South Carolina radicals deceived themselves into believing that Jackson's election would remove their troubles, it was not because of a lack of sharp admonition to the contrary. Thomas Player, a member of the legislature from Fairfield, in a long speech delivered during the 1828 session pointed out clearly the helplessness of the incoming administration to redress the wrongs suffered by his state. Player was not an embittered radical, even opposing in this session the calling of a convention.<sup>30</sup>

For the next four years, 1828 to 1832, the anti-tariff sentiment grew in South Carolina but was either overshadowed by the more absorbing issue of putting the state "on its sovereignty" in opposing the federal government or else having been taken up into that movement and having been forced to conform itself to the exigencies of a doctrinaire campaign, it lost many phases of a natural development.

A few characteristic features of the state's tariff views between 1828 and the critical stages of nullification in 1832 may, however, be distinguished. Up to the time of the "tariff of

<sup>28</sup> Hamilton to Jackson, November 15, 1828, Jackson papers.

<sup>29</sup> A. P. Hayne to Jackson, September 20, 1828, Jackson papers.

<sup>30</sup> Printed entire in *Columbia Telescope*, February 20, 1829.

abominations'' the one section of the state least touched by the tariff agitation had been the great short fibre cotton planting region. With the back country proverbially opposed to any program owing its inception to the lowlands, it was absolutely essential to win over the great dominant planting section before the parishes of the tidewater region could hope to control the state and command the two-thirds majority necessary to launch the state on any radical line of procedure. Whether by design or by accident, McDuffie fell upon a very efficacious slogan in the form of his "forty bale" theory. This classic statement of pessimism when coupled with the despair that came with falling cotton prices, high interest charges for land, and slaves bought at exorbitant prices, proved a powerful weapon to drive the state to desperate action.

The extremeness of McDuffie's position is evidenced by the action of Cardoza, editor for many years of the *Southern Patriot*, who was an authority on trade conditions as well as an economist of considerable prominence. Cardoza had opposed the tariffs of 1816, 1820, 1824, 1827, and 1828, and his arguments had been such as to suggest doubtless to McDuffie his lucidly stated "forty bale" theory. Cardoza had argued that destructive tariffs would ultimately tell upon the national well-being by interfering with our free exchange of commodities with the rest of the world. But by 1830 Cardoza was pointing out the fallacy in McDuffie's position while he maintained that the tariff was not to be considered a burdensome load upon the planting interests but rather a great national onus which would be discarded if once understood. Cardoza saw clearly the futility of separate action by South Carolina and feared a substantial lack of support from the shipping and agricultural interests if the issue became identified with the planting interests, especially an interest resting on the institution of slavery. By 1832 Cardoza had come to support the tariff bill of that year which the radicals were to call the worst of all tariffs up to date. It is hard to tell how far his conduct was determined by a feeling that the bill of 1832 worked real reduction and to what extent he was actuated by antipathy to nullification and the nullifiers.

One who follows the growth of radicalism in South Carolina from 1828 to 1832 will soon realize that although the tariff was

the avowed bone of contention, yet the excess of feeling was not proportional to the aggressions of the tariff forces nor to the conviction on the part of the citizenship of South Carolina of its economic injustice. The explanation is to be found in another series of events that rushed the majority party of the state into conflict with the federal authorities. But this portrayal belongs rather to a discussion of nullification than to the history of South Carolina's attitude toward the tariff.

It was an interesting development which took place to change the two to one majority of 1828 against radical action into a two to one majority sufficient to call the convention which nullified the federal tariff laws in 1832. Among the most important of the agencies bringing this to pass was the decision, somewhat unexpectedly announced, that President Jackson would ignore his preëlection promise and stand for a second term. Up to this time men like McDuffie had seemingly found ground for hope that the tariff was to be gradually undermined. An auspicious start had been made with many articles having a wide consumption in the planting states, and Jackson's veto of government aid to the Maysville road project in May, 1830, offered even more hope to the anti-tariff forces.<sup>31</sup> But a second term would necessitate the placating of the protective interests of Pennsylvania. Again, the open breach between the president and the vice-president influenced the trend of radicalism in their native state, although in an opposite direction from that which is commonly supposed. The determining factor was the decision of the leaders to keep Calhoun's political ambitions completely separate from the destinies of their program. In this light the crisis afforded by the rabid speech of McDuffie May 19, 1831, on the occasion of a dinner given in his honor by Hamilton in Charleston, assumes a new meaning.

The subordination of the tariff question to the more pressing one of nullification is evidenced clearly in the attempts of the former adherents of the protective principle to enter a protest against the tariff aggressions and thus weaken the charge of

<sup>31</sup> See Ritchie's account of his interview with McDuffie, who was returning from the session of congress. *John P. Branch historical papers of Randolph-Macon college*, no. 2: 147. On the Maysville turnpike project to which the government was asked to subscribe \$150,000 for stock, see Turner, *Rise of the new west*, 139-145.

their opponents that they were lacking in loyalty to their native state. Again those representatives in congress who were hoping and working for an amelioration of tariff burdens were freely charging that the radicals, especially those of South Carolina, were doing their best to defeat improvements in order to get a chance to try their remedy of nullification, which was expected by its friends to strike down once for all the author of all their woes.<sup>32</sup>

JOHN L. CONGER

KNOX COLLEGE  
GALESBURG, ILLINOIS

<sup>32</sup> William Drayton to Joes R. Poinsett, January 23, 1832, April 13, 1832, Poinsett manuscripts, in Pennsylvania historical society library; see also letter of Cambreling to Poinsett, January 23, 1832, in the same collection.